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and necessary means."'18 These promises indicate that Beijing's leaders were more willing than ever before to commit China to the cause of the Vietnamese revolution.
There were profound domestic and international causes underlying Beijing's adoption of a more aggressive strategy toward the escalating conflicts in South-East Asia. First, Beijing's more enthusiastic attitude toward Hanoi has to be understood in the context of the rapid radicalization of China's political and social life, as well as Mao Zedong's desire to create strong dynamics for such radicalization, in the 1960s. Since the early days of the People's Republic, Mao had never concealed his ambition to transform China into a land of universal equality and justice under the banner of socialism and Communism. In the late 1950s Mao's grand plans of "transforming Chinese society" led to the Great Leap Forward, which turned out to be a nation-wide catastrophe. He told Duan that the CCP had made the decision that "it is our policy that we will do our best to support you. We will offer whatever you are in need of and we are in a position to offer." Liu also stressed that "if you do not invite us, we will not come; and if you invite one unit of our troops, we will send that unit to you. The initiative will be completely at your disposal.""44
In spite of these promises, there are clues that divergences existed between the two sides. Following Mao's instructions, the Chinese General Staff quickly worked out a preliminary plan to send around 100,000 Chinese engineering troops to Vietnam for road construction. On 25 May, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting to discuss the plan. He told the participants that as the Americans were expanding the war in Vietnam, they would naturally increase their efforts to cut off the North's support to the revolutionary forces in the South. It was therefore necessary for Hanoi to send more of its own people to reinforce the transportation corridors in lower Laos. For this reason, it was also necessary for China to take over the main responsibility of consolidating and expanding the road capacities in North Vietnam, the northern part in particular. Yang Chengwu then reported to the meeting that the Chinese General Staff had two different plans for dispatching troops to Vietnam. The first was to follow the suggestion of Ho Chi Minh and start the construction of all 12 roads at the same time, which would require more than 100,000 engineering troops. The second plan was to concentrate first on the construction of five to seven of the most needed roads, which would require an initial dispatch of around 80,000 troops. Yang recommended the second plan, which Zhou also favoured. The meeting decided that the two plans would be presented to the Vietnamese simultaneously, but the Chinese would make it clear that they favoured the second.
A Vietnamese governmental delegation for transportation affairs vis- 
